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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes the civil revolution in Ukraine, which is also known as the Euromaidan
Revolution. It is regarded as the Revolution of Dignity by Ukrainian citizens. In this respect,
this paper focuses on a clariﬁcation of the dynamics of the Ukrainian civil revolution. The
authors will try to trace the essential causes, processes, and historical implications of the
Euromaidan Revolution. In addition, we plan to assess the nature of civil revolution. This
study not only was based on the primary sources in Ukrainian language but also was de-
scribed from the perspective of the participants of the revolution.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction: the reasons for the revolutionary
movement in Ukraine
Euromaidan, the protest movement, occurred in Ukraine
on November 21, 2013, transpired when President
Yanukovych unilaterally delayed the signing of the Euro-
pean Union Association Agreement. Thus, it was the abrupt
policy shift from Pro-European to Pro-Russian by the second
Azarov government that propelled the thousands of dem-
onstrators (predominantly young students) to go out onto
the streets. After Berkut, the Ukraine Special Force, had bru-
tally beaten the peaceful protesters onMaidan Nezalezhnosti
(translated as “Independence Square”), the student protest
quickly evolved into amass action of a national scope against
the existing power.
The rapid and dramatic expansion of the civil resis-
tance was due to the extremely critical attitude of the people
about the polices that were being implemented by those
in power, as well as the authoritarian use of power.
Ukraine ranked last among European countries, accord-
ing to the index of conﬁdence concerning governments, as
evaluated by the people in their respective countries. The
conﬁdence in the Parliament was 1.99 on a 10-point scale
(last place), the level of dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment was 2.25, the conﬁdence in the judicial system was
2.26 (last place), and the conﬁdence in the police was 2.50
(the last place). Moreover, according to the results of the
research, the conﬁdence in Yanukovych regime was at all-
time low since the establishment of independent Ukraine.1
These polling results tell us that, in fact, the current Ukrai-
nian powers that be had lost its legitimacy.
All those factors were reasons that caused the Ukraini-
an people to resist against the then current power elites and
institutions. However, a deterioration of the social and eco-
nomic situation and crippling of civil rights and liberties are
not suﬃcient reasons for social revolution. There are coun-
tries that are evaluated to have worse indicators but without
any sign of revolution. Social revolutions start when people
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are utterly disappointed by the ability of the government
to improve their life (the so-called second famine effect).
The estimation of “the governmental eﬃciency” by in-
ternational experts has rated Ukraine on par with Ghana,
the Philippines, and Peru, and inferior to countries such as
Mali, Namibia, Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia.
According to the same experts the Ukrainian government
was more eﬃcient than the governments of countries such
as Honduras, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Zambia, and Malawi.2
An important factor for the spreading of a revolution-
ary mood is discrimination among the population, albeit not
formally acknowledged. Nationalistic or religious leaders
with anti-government sentiment often advocate the ne-
cessity of revolutionary actions. In their eyes, the government
does not possess full legitimacy. Indicative in this respect
is the fact that the bulk of the protesters are mainly the
Ukrainian speakers fromWestern Ukraine and Greek Roman
Catholics of that religious aﬃliation. Solidarity with the pro-
testers was expressed by the Crimean Tatar population of
Crimea and almost all other major religious denomina-
tions, except for the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
The protests by many entrepreneurs against the current
tax policy (the so-called Tax Maidan), by students against
the policy in education, and the demonstrations against the
arbitrary police actions in Vradiyivka (e.g., arrests and de-
tentions), were only the forerunners of the nationwide civil
resistance.
However, the most salient reason for the revolution is
the failure of the new (post-Soviet) political elites in re-
forming Ukraine and building up a new statehood. Despite
its newly earned independence, Ukraine has remained as
an ineﬃcient hybrid of the old (Soviet) and new (oligar-
chic) in its management and leadership. That is, the current
political crisis in Ukraine is simply the external manifes-
tation of a systemic crisis: the political elite’s lack of will
to reform and their ineﬃciency in policymaking since the
1990s.
In addition, rampant corruption among the elites accel-
erated the social and economic deterioration. The following
statistics allude to this fact. First, according to the data of
the International Transparency Organization, Ukraine ranked
in 144th place, along with Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Iran,
Cameroon, and the Central African Republic, whichwas three
points less than the previous year (2011). Second, accord-
ing to the Corruption Perception Index, which is determined
by a 100 point scale, Russia ranked 127th place with 28
points, Kazakhstan ranked 140th with 26 points, whereas
Ukraine ranked 144th with 25 points. The former Soviet
Union countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, were ranked
in 168th place with 17 points. By the standard of Interna-
tional Transparency Organization, scoring less than 30 points
is a “disgrace to the nation.”3
The process of European integration for many Ukraini-
ans outlined not only the geo-strategic vector of its
development but also the hope for a change in the “rules
of game,” which would bring about the modernization of
economic and political life.4 The retreat from the Europe-
an integration process meant the collapse of that hope,
which served as the spark that ignited the ﬂame of Ukrai-
nian revolution.
2. Impetus for the revolution
The material that fueled the Revolution of Dignity was
the youth, more speciﬁcally, the students. These are the par-
ticipants who were ready to take part in the revolutionary
activities despite its apparent risks. The chaos in the tran-
sition of economic system caused a number of social
problems. One of which was the devaluation of education
because of the severe jobmarket. This inevitably led the dis-
gruntled students to the streets.
In Ukraine, according to oﬃcial reports, on September
1, 2013, the number of registered unemployed was 435.4
thousand people, of which young people (from the ages of
14–35 years) were 183.3 thousand persons or 42.1%. In 2012,
those registered at the State Employment Service were 887.9
thousand unemployed people under the age 35, or 48.6%
of the total number of persons who were registered; 52.9
thousand of them were college graduates, 33.5 thousand
completed vocational schools, and 6.3 thousand second-
ary school graduates. Among young people in the age group
of 24–29 years, the unemployment rate increased, as com-
pared with the year 2011, to 9.5% from 9.2%. Almost one-
third of the total number of unemployed young Ukrainians
were in labor exchange for more than a year since their
release.5
This new generation, who has not smelled the gunpow-
der and has not participated in the previous revolutionary
events, was the most active protesters this time around. The
Ukrainian youth, de facto, declared a “new policy” quali-
tatively different from the previous one, not only by its name,
but also in its form and content. This attempt is in the same
vein with the revolutionary sentiment of 1968 in Western
Europe, which was also against conservative society and its
legacy of political and unethical values. It was a struggle of
generations, parents, and children. In this context, the ideal
of the Ukrainian youth and the impetus for the revolution
lie in the hope of changing Ukrainian society and pursu-
ing salutary European values.
3. Euromaidan as a socio-political phenomenon
Euromaidan as a dynamic process and socio-political phe-
nomenon can be dissected into the following three stages.
• Stage 1. Student’s Euromaidan
• Stage 2. Maidan-Camp
• Stage 3. Maidan-Sich (Struggle)
2 Ukraїna vtra*aє pozi,ії u rcjtingu dcmokratії //Ukraїns6ka pravda.- 19 bcrczn:
2013.// http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/03/19/6985839/.
3 Ukraїna *crcz sistcmnu bczdі:l6nіst6 vladi ostato*no otaborilas: v klubі
najkorumpovanі0i% dcr#av svіtu:Prcs rclіz Transparency International v Ukraїnі
vіd 05 grudn: 2012.// http://ti-ukraine.org/cpi.
4 Yuriy Shveda, “The Revolution of Dignity in the Context of Social Theory
of Revolutions,” RSEW 5–6/2014, vol. 42, p. 21.
5 Gct6man Є.Molodі#nc bczrobіtt:: vtra*cnc pokolіnn:? // Ukraїns6ka pravda.
Ckonomі*na pravda.- 2 #ovtn: 2013.// http://www.epravda.com.ua/
publications/2013/10/2/397038/.
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The complexity of periodization is because of the diﬃ-
culty in deﬁning the precise deﬁnition of the chronological
boundaries of individual events, as the scope of each in-
tersects and overlaps, without there being an accurate
picture of its transformation from one phase to another. Nev-
ertheless, the qualitative characteristics of each of the
selected phases are quite distinct.
3.1. Student’s Euromaidan
In November 2013, Ukrainian government, led by Pres-
ident Viktor Yanukovych and PrimeMinister Mykola Azarov,
was preparing for the Vilnius Summit (November 25–27),
where the Association Agreement and Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) were to be signed by
Ukraine and the EU.
However, on November 21, at 4 P.M., the Cabinet of
Ukraine issued an order “… to suspend the process of prep-
aration of the Association Agreement with the EU.”6
The public did not take long to react. By 10 P.M. of the
same day, at Independence Square (the main metropoli-
tan area), hundreds of activists gathered, as the word
“Euromaidan” circulated on the social networks. During the
night, the size of the protest steadily increased as the com-
munity leaders, opposing party members, and Ukranian
natioinalistic groups joined in.
“…people did not come to the politicians today, but the
politicians came to the people” – a famous Ukrainian op-
positionist, Yuriy Lutsenko, recollects.7
Indeed, there was not a single party banner on the
Maidan entirely throughout its initial phase.
However, with the increasing number of participants, the
Ukrainian Court prohibited any types of gatherings on In-
dependence Square, St. Sophia, and European squares, and
on Khreschatyk, but that did not stop the protesters: they
decided to stay for the night. On the same night, dozens of
people came to the squares of their cities in Lviv, Ivano-
Frankivsk, Kharkiv and other places in Ukraine.
On the morning of November 22, local authorities under
the guise of preparing for a Christmas Fair tried to drive out
the protesters and demolished their tents at the center of
Kyiv.
At the same time, students in Lviv proclaimed to strike.
The march of the students grew like an avalanche and their
number was more than ten thousand.
Students were the driving force of the protest move-
ment, whichwas not only afraid of changes, but also required
them. They formed the basis of the protest movement during
the ﬁrst stage of Euromaidan, which started as peaceful pro-
tests with political demands for changing (or rather,
returning) to European integration as the nation’s foreign
policy. The distinctive feature of this stage was the deci-
sive role of students in the spreading of the protest
movement, rather than the political parties.
During the night of November 23 and 24, groups of citi-
zens began to arrive in Kyiv, especially students from
different cities in Ukraine, because on November 24 a pro-
European march for Ukraine has been planned. It brought
together more than hundred thousand people, which
shocked not only the elite powers but also the opposition.
During this process, the character of Euromaidan began to
be transformed.
There were two “Maidans” already existing in Kiev at the
time. The ﬁrst one, at Independence Square, was a “public”
one, and the second one, at the European Square, was the
“political” one where, of course, party symbols and leaders
started appearing. On November 26, the leaders of both
Euromaidans decided to join forces on the condition that
politicians would not exploit the situation for their politi-
cal purposes.
During the meeting, several demands were made to the
President. In particular, the resignation of Azarov’s cabinet,
adoption of laws necessary for European integration, and
signing the Association Agreement, etc. As the authorities
ignored these demands, leaders of Euromaidan had to either
abandon or continue protesting on the Maidan. Many ac-
tivists, by the way, chose the ﬁrst option and left the capital.
3.2. Maidan-camp
On the night of November 31, as the Maidan dwindled
to less than half a thousand activists (most of them were
students), authorities sent two thousand security forces, who
dispersed the youth in a cruel and ruthless manner.
The brutality against students served as the catalyst for
the second phase of Euromaidan. The abuses of the police
forces and violent suppression against student protesters
provoked the transformation of the student movement into
the nationwide movement against the regime, as if a spark
ignited a barrel of gunpowder, which caused a social
explosion.
The next morning, a video footage of students being
beaten by the police was released not only in Ukraine but
also to the world; a barrage of criticism poured in against
the authorities, such as from the European Union, NATO, the
UN, the clergy, and international NGOs. Ukrainian citizens
rose against the oppressive government.
On December 1, as a result, protesters came back to Kiyv,
but this time with more radical sentiments and slogans.
Gathered at St. Michael’s Square, the activists started the
move that brought together half a million citizens, return-
ing them to the Independence Square. On the same day, a
group of activists occupied the Kyiv City State Administra-
tion Oﬃce and clashes took place on Bankova Street.
The second stage changed not only the character of
Euromaidan itself but also its requirements. If the main
slogans of the ﬁrst phase were focused on signing of the
Association Agreement with the EU and returning to the Eu-
ropean integration course; on the other hand, the second
stage, was about the resignation of Yanukovych and his
cabinet.
The slogans became more and more radical after the
beating of students, as compared with those heard before
the incident.
6 Government adopted a decree on suspension of the process of prep-
aration for the Association Agreement with the EU.// http://www.kmu.gov
.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=246868715&cat_id=244274160
-16.
7 Bіlozcrs6ka INFO. Єvromajdan.- 21 listopada 2013.// http://www
.bilozerska.info/?p=17429.
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Euromaidan itself changed. The protesters set up barri-
cades after the police assault on December 11 and then the
Square resembled a fortiﬁedmilitary camp, soon to bemore
disciplined and organized, thereby reﬂecting their anti-
government sentiment.
3.3. Maidan-sich (struggle)
On January 16, 2014, which marks the beginning of the
third stage, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the so-
called dictatorial law.8 It contained legislature such as
prohibiting outdoor assembly and demonstrations. That
action by the government can be viewed as turning de-
mocracy into something similar to authoritarian Belarus and
also a desperate attempt to retain power. However, the
protest only grew in instensity. Eventually, bloody clashes
occurred on Januray 22 at Hrushevskogo Street (near the
Presidential Administration Building) and several
Euromaidan participants were killed on the “Bloody Reunion
Day.” The authorities’ goal to intimidate protesters did not
succeed.
The adoption of these laws inﬂuenced not only the capital
but also other regions. In some parts of Ukraine, there were
attempts to seize local executive oﬃces, some of which were
successful. This phenomenon happened in all of the western
regions (except the Transcarpathian region), as well as in
some central parts of Ukraine. As the result, several meet-
ings between the representatives of the opposition and
Yanukovych were held during January and February to settle
that matter peacefully. The meetings were held with the in-
tervention of European politicians, including Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of Poland, France, Germany, and the Presi-
dential Envoy of the Russian Federation. However, the talks
did not produce the desired results, especially becasue of
the condition that reelection of the President was to be held
in December 2014 (proposed on February 21), which was
rejected by the Maidan since no one wanted to endure
Yanukovych for another year.
From February 18 to 21, 2014, the bloodiest events of
Euromaidan had taken place; the government usedweapons
against the peaceful protesters, duringwhich 88 Euromaidan
participants were killed. Counting subsequent deaths, in-
cluding those who died from injuries sustained during the
protests, resulted in a total of over 113 deaths, who are re-
ferred to as the “Heaven hundred.” They were the heroes
of the “Revolution of Dignity.” The demography of the
victims proves that Euromaidan covered the whole Ukraine:
from theWest, Kyiv, Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, and other areas,
even including other countries (e.g., Belarus, Georgia).
On February 21, the Euromaidan participants rejected an
agreement between the opposition politicians and the Pres-
ident and stormed the Presidential Palace, insisting on his
ouster. Yanukovuch ﬂed from Kyiv upon realizing the se-
verity of the situation. The following day, the Parliament,
reﬂecting the request of the citizens, removed Yanukovych
from the position of President of Ukraine. This date can be
considered as the end of the third stage of Euromaidan’s
transformation, the logical end of the Revolution of Dignity.
4. The waves of revolution and democratization
All the current problems facing Ukraine happened not
in isolation but in the context of the global political pro-
cesses, which undoubtedly affected Ukrainian political
events. That is, the past waves of revolutions inﬂuenced the
course of the Ukrainian civil revolution. Most modern social
revolutions (except the 1917 Revolution in Russia) were at-
tempts to modernize society through westernization. In this
regard, one cannot ignore the continuity of revolutionary
movements in Ukraine with the so-called Velvet Revolu-
tions, which happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s
in Central and Eastern Europe.
Observed from a historical viewpoint, revolutionary ac-
tivities tend to repeat at regular intervals, which is the
concept of revolutionary waves. They affect the country with
close cultural proximity and historical ties, which can be ana-
lyzed as being in two stages. The ﬁrst stage is the prevalence
of nationalistic sentiment. The second stage is the preva-
lence of social and economical issues.
Notably, there were the following waves of revolution-
ary movement in the late modern era.
1968: The waves of protest movements in Western Europe.
1989: Velvet revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe.
2004: The Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
In addition to the somewhat distant historical events,
more contemporary events, such as Arab Spring, are also
likely to have had inﬂuenced the course of political events
in Ukraine by invoking the yearning for democracy among
the citizens. Hence, the collapse of the so-called imitative
democracies has been the inevitable outcome of historical
“progress,” of which Ukraine was an integral part. There has
been a surge of global democratic activities. Ironically, revo-
lutions have been the point of rapprochement for various
conditions and circumstances of different countries as the
agent of diffusing democratic ideas and slogans against
quasi-democratic governments.
5. The revolution of dignity and Ukrainian nationalist
movements
The process of the Ukrainian state formation had lasted
for centuries, which was deemed completed only around
1954, in which Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR.
Aside from the Crimean problem, the Eastern and Western
parts of Ukraine have been ruled by different states for cen-
turies: only for the last seven decades have they been under
the USSR rule. Hence, the regional differences in Ukraine
have been very signiﬁcant. Central and Western Ukraine
were inﬂuenced by Europe, whereas Southern and Eastern
Ukraine by Russia.
Even after its independence, the regionalism of Ukraine
lingered on as the critical agenda, which could possibly splin-
ter the unity of the nation. The phenomenon of this
regionalism has manifested itself in political process and
the Orange Revolution. The stark linguistic and cultural
8 Rada u%valila zakoni, 2o vіdkriva8t6 0l:% do masovi% rcprcsіj – fond
“Vіdrod#cnn:”.// http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/16/7009773/.
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differences between the two regions and external pres-
sures from Russia certainly instigated separatist intentions
among the Russian-speaking populace in Ukraine, but it re-
mained dormant without materializing into action because
the pro-European identity prevailed in the early stage of its
independence; although the Eastern and Southern parts of
Ukraine were not necessarily pro-European, among themost
popular national identity was the “One Ukraine.” However,
the concept gradually lost its popularity fromWest to East
and from North to South, but in the East, it still remained
the strongest in its “national weight class.”9
The Ukrainian-speaking populace, clearly not the ma-
jority, was the largest and the most united among the
minorities in Ukraine, who were eager for political and eco-
nomic reforms as compared with others.10 This created a
paradoxical situation in the early years of independent
Ukraine: during the presidential campaign the winning can-
didate was decided by voters from the Eastern and Southern
regions, but once elected the President had to rely on the
Central andWestern regions. This may seem strange but is,
in fact, logical. The legitimacy of a government depends on
its people as the only source of power in a democracy. Some
parts of the population (in this case, South and East Ukraine)
deemed themselves the citizens of a non-existent state
(USSR) and thus did not support reform. Hence, the gov-
ernment appealed to patriotic groups, whichwere the largest
and most inﬂuential of all existing social groups – albeit not
the absolute majority of the country.11
Since the beginning of the independent Ukraine, the au-
thorities gave favorable treatment to the moderate
nationalists, the so-called National Democrats, repre-
sented by the parties on the right side of spectrum, such
as the People’s Movement of Ukraine, Ukrainian Republi-
can Party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and others.
The “Right,” in turn, were willing to cooperate with the post-
communist government because Ukrainian nationalism,
especially the post-colonial liberation political move-
ment, was aimed at reviving the statehood of Ukraine; that
is, “developing of the state” came ﬁrst, thereby avoiding any
sudden actions that could potentially pose a threat to its
existence as an independent nation. Hence, the post-
Soviet Ukrainian nationalist guidelines accommodated liberal
and democratic ideas that subsequently led to their easy and
organic combination of the patriotic forces’ centrist plan.
However, national radicals, the so-called “ultra-Right,”
such as the Ukrainian National Assembly, Ukrainian Na-
tional Self-Defense, the Social Nationalist Party of Ukraine,
and some others, insisted on carrying out drastic changes
in society, e.g., a strong Ukrainization in Ukraine and de-
communization. However, the Ukrainians and its leadership
perceived them as a destructive element. Also, large
ﬁnancial-industrial corporations and regional economic
elites, who had clout over the Ukrainian political process
and the major media, were reluctant to invest in the un-
predictable radicals. In addition, the predominantlymoderate
disposition of Ukrainian voters did not provide a favorable
environment for the radicals. Consequently, the radical na-
tionalists have occupied only a marginal position in the
Ukrainian political and public spheres.
Through the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002,
the supporters of the national-democratic parties, in favor
of pro-European policy and the protection of Ukrainian na-
tional culture, havemore than doubled (from 10.2% to 21.5%).
It is important to note that the popularity of the right-
wing parties did not just increase in quantity, but, in fact,
expanded geographically fromWestern to Central Ukraine.
In 1998, the voters in only two regions of Western Ukraine
(Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk) voted for the right-wing
parties with more than 50% support. About a quarter of the
voters in Lviv, Rivne, and Volyn supported the right-wing
parties. As compared with 1998, the right-wing party can-
didates in 2002 received more than 50% support in the six
regions of Western Ukraine (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv,
Rivne, Volyn, and Chernivtsi) and received about 25% support
in nine areas, notably eight of them from Central Ukraine.
In effect, they established a political stronghold in almost
all Ukrainian ethnic territories, which formerly belonged to
the Prince and the Hetman of Ukraine and Poland and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire during the early 20th century. Two
years later, the same regions, essentially the basin for the
Orange Revolution, unanimously supported presidential can-
didate Viktor Yushchenko.
After the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–
2010), who claimed to be a Ukrainian nationalist, ended in
a ﬁasco, the nationalist ideology also lost its popularity. As
a result, Viktor Yanukovych, who relied on the support of
the population of southeastern regions of Ukraine, was
elected as the President in 2010. The new government began
to pursue policies aimed at radicalization of deliberate con-
frontation in a society of culture, language, and identity.
Many Ukrainians deemed those policies of the ruling party
as anti-national. As part of the wave of protests against
Yanukovych government, the ultra right-wing party,
“Svoboda,” won the parliamentary elections in 2012 with
10.5% support. This is tantamount to a “landslide” result,
considering the results of the parliamentary elections in
2006 and 2007, of which theywon amodest 0.36% and 0.76%
of the votes, respectively.
As stated above, “Svoboda” became the ﬁrst radical na-
tionalist party to enter the Ukrainian Parliament. However,
the success of Svoboda does not signify popular support for
the radical Ukrainian nationalist ideology. The support for
Svoboda was because of tactical reasons rather than ideo-
logical. First, as a protest against the anti-Ukrainian policy
of Yanukovych, the voters had chosen the most deﬁant na-
tionalist party in Ukraine. Second, in essence, Svoboda
supporters ensured the ﬁercest opposition against the gov-
ernment. This was necessary as the national-democratic
forces had discredited themselves – many of the deputies
after the victory of Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential elec-
tion turned traitor and joined the government coalition.
Given the situation, Svoboda, with a clear position and rigid
discipline, would keep its deputies in the opposition
9 Gri,ak ;. Pro scnsovnіst6 і bczscnsovnіst6 na,іonalіzmu v Ukraїnі // Gri,ak
;. Strastі za na,іonalіzmom. – Kiїv.- 2004.- C. 192-193.
10 Psi%ologі: masovoї polіti*noї svіdomostі ta povcdіnki / Vіdp. rcdaktor V.
O. Vas8tins6kij. – Kiїv.- 1997. – 163 s.; Vas8tins6kij V. Masova polіti*na
svіdomіst6 і vlada: ru% po kolu *i ru% upcrcd? // Ukraїns6kі varіanti.- 1999. -
№ 3-4. – S. 77-82.
11 Tan*in I. Postmatcrial6na: rcvol8,i: // Apologi: (Moskva). – 2005. –№
6 (Avgust). – S. 84–85.
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coalition, thereby ﬁrmly and vigorously opposing the
government.
The Revolution of Dignity was not a direct reaction
against the Yanukovych regime’s rejection of Ukrainian na-
tional values – albeit that issue mattered. The more
fundamental causes were: (1) indignation of citizens toward
the unprecedented rise in corruption, (2) failure to sign the
Association Agreement with the EU for the prospects of rap-
prochement with Russia, and (3) the brutal violence that
the police used on those who dared to express dissatisfac-
tion with Yanukovych’s policies. This general, rather than
narrow, national perspective in the ranks of protesters united
millions of people across the country, including the South-
ern and Eastern regions. However, as the “Ukrainian
Heartland” was the mainstay of the protesters, whereas the
Yanukovych regime positioned itself as Russian-oriented,
the protest movement could not have chosen another sym-
bolic language other than that of nationalist. In this context,
it is interesting to remember the traditional Ukrainian na-
tionalist slogan, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!” which
has lost its original radical nationalistic connotations, for
it manifested itself as new symbolic meanings. Previously,
it was the slogan of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who
fought against the German and Soviet occupation from 1942
to 1952 predominantly inWestern Ukraine. Now the slogan
shifted to: “Glory to the fallen heroes of Maidan.”
Separatist protests occurred against Euromaidan in the
Eastern and the Southern regions of Ukraine and were in-
stigated by the local regional elites closely associated with
Yanukovych. However, this movement would have been im-
possible without the active participation of Russian
propaganda and its agents. During civil wars, as a rule,
society becomes radical; however, the civil war between a
revolutionary regime and separatists led to an unexpect-
ed outcome in Ukraine: the radical nationalists lost its
support but the National Democrats gained popularity.
6. On success and completeness of revolutions
A revolution is deemed successful when it subverts the
established government. A revolution is deemed com-
pleted when a new government is established according to
the slogans and demands of the revolutionary masses – at
least partially.
The Orange Revolution in 2004 was successful but in-
complete as the new political elites were not able to carry
out the promulgated revolutionary tasks. The Revolution of
Dignity – in fact, a continuation of the Orange Revolution
– was another attempt of Ukrainian society at not only
changing the ruling elite but also making it carry out a rev-
olutionary program.
In general, a fall of imitative democracy does not auto-
matically mean the emergence of real democracy, which
requires tremendous efforts and time for the maturity of a
society. At times, a rapid transformation of society calls for
a social revolution, as it is a shift from a traditional to a ra-
tional type of legitimacy. The complete reloading of society
as if on a “blank slate” (that is, tabula rasa) is littered with
problems and issues. And this process requires both a well
worked out program and moral and professional
implementers.
In Ukraine, following the Euromaidan, a political force
emerged with new agenda. They are working toward es-
tablishing a new Ukrainian statehood, both in the legislature
and executive branches of the revolutionary government.
At this juncture, it can be evaluated that the Revolution of
Dignity is not only successful but also will be heading toward
completion.
7. Conclusion: the unﬁnished revolution!
The massive protests in Ukraine led to the fall of
Yanukovych’s kleptocratic regime. However, this does not
signify the end of the Revolution of Dignity, but rather its
beginning, as Ukraine requires a complete overhaul in its
political system, and not just a simple change of regime. The
Revolution of Dignity prevented the country from “slip-
ping” into open state authoritarianism. However, its main
task was to lay the foundation for a liberal and stable
democracy.
The ﬁrst step toward this direction was the advent of rev-
olutionary government, which could reﬂect the voices of
Euromaidan. On February 22, 2014, Victor Yanukovych
escaped from the country. The Parliament deemed his act
unconstitutional for abandoning his duties as the Presi-
dent. As a result of it, an election for a new president was
scheduled onMay 25, 2014.12 The presidential election took
place while Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and pro-
Russian terrorists in Donetsk and Luhansk regions were
trying to ban the election altogether. Hence, the Presiden-
tial elections did not take place in 25 (out of 225) districts
of Lugansk and Donetsk regions.13 However, despite this
tense situation, 60.3% of the Ukrainians voted.14
Other than some issues in the procedural aspects of the
election, the majority of international observers (252 rep-
resentatives from foreign countries and 2502 from
international organizations) have recognized the election
as a fair reﬂection of the will of people. Many observed that
the involvement of administrative resources (the use of
power on the side of a particular candidate) was reduced
to a minimum, as distinguished from the past elections in
which such resources were frequently exploited.
Twenty-one candidates, representing virtually all areas
of the Ukrainian political spectrum, ran for the election. But
there were two main contenders, Yulia Tymoshenko (the
leader of the party, Bat’kiwshchyna) and Petro Poroshenko,
who was supported by the Udar and Solidarnist parties.
Petro Poroshenko declared a slogan for his electoral cam-
paign, “To live in a new way!” and won the election. A
majority (54.7%) of the Ukrainians voted for him, whereas
12.81% of the Ukrainians voted for Tymoshenko.
It is interesting to know that only 2.7% of the voters sup-
portedM. Dobkin, whowas the oﬃcial candidate of the Party
of Regions and only 1.2% of the voters supported the leader
of the Ukrainian Communists, P. Symonenko. Oleg Lyashko,
12 Rada skinula ;nukovi*a // Ukraїns6ka pravda.- 22 l8togo 2014.//
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/22/7015777/.
13 .VK: 25 okrugіv na S%odіUkraїni u ncdіl8 nc golosu8t6 //Ukraїns6ka pravda.
25 travn: 2014.// http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/05/25/7026406/.
14 Ofі,іjnij sajt .VK.// http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp2014/wp063pt00
_t001f01=702pt001f01=702.html.
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leader of the Radical Party, received 8.8% of the vote and
ﬁnished in third place, whereas the leaders of the Ukrai-
nian radical nationalists, Oleg Tyagnybok (Svoboda) and
Dmytro Yarosh (The Right Sector political party), received
only 1.3% and 1.1%, respectively.15
After taking the oath of the President of Ukraine, Petro
Poroshenko promised to hold an early parliamentary elec-
tion, which to his mind would be a serious step toward the
process of lustrating the government, its “reloading.”
On October 26, 2014, the Ukrainian parliamentary elec-
tion was held. It was based on a special procedure: a mixed
proportional-majoritarian electoral systemwith a 5 percent
electoral threshold for political parties. The election was not
conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (12 dis-
tricts), in 6 districts of Lugansk region, and 9 districts of
Donetsk region. Twenty-nine political parties participated
in the national election. The voter turnout was at 52.42%.
The voting proceeded rather peacefully without any
major violations or incidents. There were some violations
that were identiﬁed by observers on the day of the elec-
tion; however, they were neither systematic nor
manipulative, and did not signiﬁcantly affect the result.16
Six political parties met the 5 percent electoral thresh-
old: the right liberal party of the former Prime Minister of
Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Narodnyi Front (22.14%);
the Petro Poroshenko Block (21.82%); the Liberal Party
Samopomich (10.97%); the party of former governmental
oﬃcials, the Oppositional Block (9.42%); the populist Radical
Party (7.44%); and the center-left party, Bat’kivshchyna, of
Yulia Tymoshenko (5.68%).17
It is noteworthy that for the ﬁrst time in the history of
Ukraine there were no Communists in the Ukrainian Par-
liament, as well as right-wing radicals.
On November 21, 2014 – the date of the anniversary of
the Revolution of Dignity – the ﬁve main political parties,
the Narodnyi Front, Petro Poroshenko Block, Liberal Party
Samopomich, Radical Party, and Bat’kivshchyna, have signed
a coalition agreement to form a parliamentary majority and
lay down the principles for its future implementation.
Despite their political diversity, the newly formed coali-
tion clearly acted as pro-European forces in unity.
Were the signed coalition agreement to be executed and
there is a deﬁnite favorable result – at least partially if not
to a full extent – we could safely say that the Revolution
of Dignity was not in vain. The revolution will be deemed
completed only when the newly formed coalition success-
fully implements a new political system with the approval
of a majority of Ukrainians. In the end, this will determine
the fate of Euromaidan.
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